Fiscal capacity to support large banks. Bruegel Policy Contribution
Issue n˚17 | 2016 by Hüttl, Pia & Schoenmaker, Dirk
Pia Hütll is an Affiliate 
Fellow at Bruegel (pia.
huettl@bruegel.org). 
Dirk Schoenmaker is 
a Senior Fellow at Bruegel 
(dirk.schoenmaker@
bruegel.org).
The authors would like 
to thank Colin Ellis, André 
Sapir, Peter Wierts and 
Guntram Wolff for useful 
comments and discussions.
Executive summary
During the global financial crisis and subsequent euro-debt crisis, the fiscal 
resources of some countries appeared to be insufficient to support their banking sys-
tems. These countries needed outside support to stabilise their banking systems and 
thereby their wider economies.
This Policy Contribution assesses the potential fiscal costs of recapitalising large banks. 
Based on past financial crises, we estimate that the cost to recapitalise an individual bank 
amounts to 4.5 percent of its total assets. During a severe crisis, a country might have to recap-
italise up to three of its large systemic banks. We assume that bail-in of private investors is not 
fully possible during a systemic crisis.
Our empirical findings suggest that large countries, such as the United States, China 
and Japan, can still provide credible fiscal backstops to their large systemic banks. In the euro 
area, the potential fiscal costs are unevenly distributed and range from 4 to 12 percent of GDP. 
Differences in the strengths of the fiscal backstops in euro-area countries contribute to diver-
gences in financing conditions across the banking union.
To counter this fragmentation, we propose that the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) could be used as a fiscal backstop to recapitalise systemically important banks directly 
within the banking union, in the case of a severe systemic crisis. But this would be only a last 
resort, after other tools such as bail-in have been used to the maximum extent possible. The 
governance of the ESM should be reconsidered, to ensure swift and clear application in times 
of crisis.
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Introduction
The aim of the European Union’s new bail-in regime is to reduce the cost of bank bailouts 
for taxpayers. While bail-in of private investors is appropriate for one-off failures, it might 
not be fully possible in the case of the failure of a systemically important bank or large parts 
of the banking system. There is concern that a bail-in of large banks might add to – instead 
of dampen – a financial panic1. The European bail-in regime permits ‘government finan-
cial stabilisation tools’ as a last resort after other resolution tools have been assessed and 
deployed to the maximum extent practicable to maintain financial stability (Articles 32 and 
56, Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), 2014/59/EU)2.
There is a lack of experience in handling large bank failures under the new resolution 
regime, both under the BRRD in Europe and under the Dodd-Frank Act in the US. Large bank 
failures might have contagion effects (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2002). The contagion can 
spread through the real exposure channel because of direct financial linkages between banks 
(the so-called domino effect) or through the information channel, with the failure of one bank 
potentially causing contagious withdrawals at ‘similar’ banks, when creditors are imperfectly 
informed about whether the shock is a one-off or more widespread.
Even if private investors are bailed-in, there is thus still a need for the government to 
maintain a fiscal backstop in case of a full-blown systemic crisis (Schoenmaker, 2015). In such 
a systemic crisis, the government might need to directly recapitalise systemically important 
banks. Goodhart (1998) argues that the standing of a banking system depends ultimately on 
the strength and credibility of the fiscal backstop.
During the global financial crisis and subsequent euro-debt crisis, some countries’ 
fiscal resources to support their banking systems appeared to be insufficient. These 
countries needed outside support from the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Financial Stability Facility and subsequently the European Stability Mechanism to stabi-
lise their banking systems and thereby their wider economies. This Policy Contribution 
develops a method to assess the potential fiscal costs for countries required to support 
their banking systems. In particular, we investigate the fiscal support for large systemic 
banks with assets of over €150 billion3. 
Fiscal costs in past crises
Fiscal capacity refers to the ability of the state to extract revenues to provide public goods. 
Applying this concept to banking, Pauly (2014) defines the fiscal capacity of a country as the 
budgetary capacity to provide a credible fiscal backstop to its banking system and the political 
capacity to activate the budget. An example of the lack of political capacity is the dithering 
approach of the Japanese Ministry of Finance in its attempts to deal with severe banking 
problems during the 1990s. The Japanese parliament did not approve any recapitalisation of 
ailing Japanese banks beyond the bare minimum, which prolonged the banking crisis, culmi-
nating in the infamous lost decade of growth.In terms of budgetary capacity, we can approx-
imate the potential budgetary needs for the recapitalisation of a country’s large banks based 
on earlier episodes. Laeven and Valancia (2013) provide a global overview of the fiscal outlays 
during past crises. The direct fiscal costs of banking crises from 1970 to 2011 were on average 
1  There have been warnings from academics (eg Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2015; Chan and Van Wijnbergen, 2015) 
and policymakers (eg Dewatripont, 2014; Geithner, 2014).
2  Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=en.
3  Gandhi, Lustig and Plazzi (2016) provide evidence that in the event of a financial crisis, stock investors price in the 
implicit government guarantees extended to large financial institutions, but not to small ones.
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4 percent of GDP for advanced countries. More importantly, the subsequent increases in debt 
(21 percent of GDP) and output losses (33 percent of GDP) were multiples of the direct fiscal 
costs on average. For the euro area, recent figures are slightly worse. The European Central 
Bank found that the direct fiscal costs of the banking crisis were 4.8 percent of euro-area GDP 
over 2008-14 (ECB, 2015)4.
Hüttl and Wolff (2016) provide a more granular overview with exact recapitalisation 
amounts for European banks during the global financial crisis and subsequent euro-debt 
crisis. Figure 1 shows that the direct fiscal costs related to financial assistance to the EU and 
US banking systems varied from country to country, with the variation resulting mainly 
from the depth of the crisis and the size of the banking system in each country. Recapitalisa-
tion of the Irish banking system represented 40 percent of GDP, while government banking 
assistance in France did not exceed 1.4 percent of GDP. The four countries with the highest 
recapitalisation costs (Ireland, Greece, Slovenia and Cyprus) needed external assistance from 
the IMF and the EU. Belgium and Spain with recapitalisation costs of about 8 percent of GDP 
were borderline cases with respect to external assistance. While Belgium could support the 
recapitalisation of its banking system without outside help, Spain needed external financial 
assistance for the recapitalisation and restructuring of its banking system, partly as a conse-
quence of far worse macro-economic conditions in Spain in 2012.
Figure 1: Direct costs of financial assistance to the European and US banking 
systems 2008-14 (% of GDP) 
Source: Bruegel based on Bruegel state aid database and Eurostat for EU and IMF WEO and US Treasury data on the TARP for the US. Note: 
Financial assistance includes recapitalisation and asset relief for both regions. 
For our purposes, we are interested in the costs of recapitalisation of large international 
banks, with total assets of at least €150 billion in the case of European banks and $165 billion 
in the case of US banks. Table 1 shows that the fiscal costs of recapitalisation and asset relief 
for each of Europe’s 22 large banks were on average 2.7 percent of these banks’ total assets. 
Applying a 99 percent confidence interval, we find a range from 1.1 to 4.3 percent of total 
bank assets.
4  Laeven and Valencia (2013) show that the direct fiscal costs of bank bailouts are comparable for the euro area at 3.9 
percent of GDP and the US at 4.5 percent of GDP.
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Table 1: Direct recapitalisation of large European banks (2008-13) 
# Bank name Country
Total assets* 
(€ billions)
State aid** 
(€ billions)
State aid as % 
of total assets
1 BNP Paribas FR 2,070.0 10.8 0.2%
2
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group
UK 2,050.0 81.1 4.0%
3 Crédit Agricole Group FR 1,740.0 6.0 0.3%
4 Société Générale FR 1,075.0 3.4 0.3%
5 Groupe BPCE FR 1,030.0 0.5 0.05%
6 ING Bank NL 960.0 15.0 1.6%
7 Commerzbank DE 735.0 18.2 2.5%
8 Lloyds Banking Group UK 715.0 28.3 4.0%
9 Crédit Mutuel Group FR 580.0 2.4 0.4%
10 BNP Paribas Fortis BE 530.0 10.8 2.0%
11 Dexia BE 520.0 17.4 3.4%
12 Nordea Bank SE 510.0 0.5 0.1%
13
Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg
DE 410.0 14.0 3.4%
14 ABN AMRO Group NL 380.0 16.9 4.4%
15 Bayerische Landesbank DE 380.0 10.8 2.6%
16
Hypo Real Estate 
Holding
DE 345.0 10.7 3.1%
17 KBC Group BE 340.0 10.8 3.2%
18 NORD/LB DE 225.0 3.1 1.4%
19
Banca Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena
IT 215.0 5.8 2.7%
20 HSH Nordbank DE 175.0 3.0 1.7%
21 Bank of Ireland IE 170.0 7.1 4.2%
22 Allied Irish Banks IE 150.0 21.4 14.1%
Average 2.7%
Lower and upper 
bounds*** 
1.1 – 4.3%
 
Source: Bruegel based on Bruegel state aid to banks database, SNL financials, and banks annual reports. Note: reported are the banks 
with total assets above €150 billion; * figures refer to the year when state aid was given, ranging from 2008 to 2013; ** including recapi-
talisation and asset relief; *** based on 99 percent confidence interval.
Similar calculations can be done for the US. We use data from the Capital Purchase Pro-
gramme (CCP), which was part of the Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) put into place 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in October 20085. Table 2 shows that in the US, the 13 
large banks received on average 2.5 percent of their total assets through the bank support pro-
grammes under TARP. The range for the 99 percent confidence interval is from 0.8 to 4.2 per-
cent of total bank assets. The US numbers are similar to those for Europe.
5  The amount of capital provided through the Capital Purchase Programme (CCP) was about $205 billion, benefiting 
707 institutions. The CPP’s mechanism to inject capital was based on purchases of senior preferred stock and warrants 
exercisable for common stock with a promised dividend of 5 percent for the first five years and 9 percent thereafter. In 
addition to CCP, we also consider the funds given to Bank of America and Citigroup under the Targeted Investment 
Programme (TIP) and the funds given to Ally Financials under the Automotive Industry Financing Programme (AIFP), 
because these also concern financial institutions that provide credit to the economy.
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Table 2: Direct recapitalisation of large US banks (2008-09)
# Bank name
Total assets 
($ billions)
State aid 
($ billions)
State aid as % of 
total assets
1 JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2,175.0 25.0 1.1%
2 Citigroup 1,940.0 45.0 2.3%
3 Bank of America 
Corporation
1,820.0 45.0 2.5%
4 Wells Fargo & Company 1,310.0 25.0 1.9%
5 Goldman Sachs Group* 850.0 10.0 1.2%
6 Morgan Stanley* 770.0 10.0 1.3%
7 PNC Financial Services 
Group
290.0 7.6 2.6%
8 U.S. Bancorp 270.0 6.6 2.5%
9 Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation
240.0 3.0 1.3%
10 SunTrust Banks 190.0 4.9 2.6%
11 State Street Corporation 175.0 2.0 1.1%
12 Ally Financial* 170.0 17.5 10.2%
13 Capital One Financial 
Corporation
165.0 3.6 2.1%
Average 2.5% 
Lower and upper 
bounds**
0.8 – 4.2%
 
Source: Bruegel based on US Treasury data on TARP and SNL financials. Note: reported are the banks with total assets above $165 billion 
end-2008; * total assets available only for 2009; ** based on 99 percent confidence interval.
Potential fiscal costs in future crises
What is a credible fiscal backstop of a country’s banking system? We map out scenarios for 
the fiscal costs of a systemic bank bailout. In this context, it is important to note that while 
bail-in is the normal procedure under the EU’s new BRRD regime, it might be left aside for 
broader financial stability considerations, as explained in the introduction. Our first step was 
to determine the potential recapitalisation costs for one bank. Tables 1 and 2 show that the 
recapitalisation costs for different banks varied considerably during recent financial crises, 
with individual cases of 10 to 15 percent of total bank assets. The 99 percent confidence in-
terval provides a reasonable estimate for the recapitalisation costs and ranges from 0.8 to 4.3 
percent of total bank assets. Taking the upper limit for the recapitalisation of EU and US banks 
as a conservative estimate, we standardise recapitalisation costs at 4.5 percent of total assets.
The standardised recapitalisation costs are close to the average capital ratio (ie leverage 
ratio) of the large European banks found by Schoenmaker and Véron (2016). The fact that the 
costs amount to the average ratio basically means that the assumed losses wipe out a bank’s 
equity and the authorities have to replenish that equity to assure the continuity of that bank’s 
critical functions. Similarly, Dermine and Schoenmaker (2010) argued that a bank’s equity is a 
good proxy for potential recapitalisation costs. Our second step was to determine the range of 
bailout costs during a severe systemic crisis. We assume a scenario in which the three largest 
banks might need to be recapitalised. In doing so, we can establish a country’s total potential 
costs. An alternative scenario of a systemic banking crisis is that a large part (say X percent) of 
the banking system, covering both small and large banks, is under strain (such as in Spain). 
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In that scenario, 4.5 percent of X percent of total banking system assets would be our proxy 
for potential bailout costs. However, this scenario is beyond the scope of this paper, which 
focuses on the recapitalisation of large banks.
Table 3 shows that bailout costs for the top three banks range from 1.6 to 3.7 percent of 
GDP for large economies, such as China, the US and the euro area. Japan follows closely with 
6.6 percent of GDP. These figures are sufficiently low to make a fiscal backstop for the large 
banks in these countries credible. Table 3 also shows that the potential costs for Germany and 
Italy are within the 4 to 5 percent range, but these countries are not home to global banks with 
€2 to €3 trillion in total assets, with the exception of Deutsche Bank. Similarly, Belgium and 
Austria face potential costs of 5 to 7 percent of GDP.
The other euro-area countries with large banks such as France, Spain and the Netherlands, 
and non-euro area countries such as Denmark and Sweden, could face potential fiscal costs 
for bailing out the largest banks of 10 to 12 percent of GDP, according to our calculations. 
Switzerland would face slightly higher, and the UK slightly lower, bail-out costs. The poten-
tial fiscal costs for these countries are at the high end, when compared with past crises (see 
Figure 1). By contrast, the central and eastern EU member states face relatively low equity-to-
GDP ratios, because their banking sectors are characterised by large shares of foreign owned 
banks, as opposed to home-country banks. Many of these foreign owned banks have parent 
banks with headquarters in the euro area, and the ultimate costs of financial support will fall 
on countries where the headquarters are located (Hüttl and Schoenmaker, 2016).
Overall, the credibility of the fiscal backstop in some countries is less strong. We should 
note that these calculations do not take into account bail-in, which would reduce the poten-
tial costs for the government, or the fiscal space in individual countries (on the latter, see 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013).
Table 3: Potential fiscal costs for major countries, 2015 (as a % of GDP)
Countries
Assets 
in $ billions
‘Equity’ 
in $ billions
Equity/GDP 
Top 3 banks China 8991 405 3.7%
Top 3 banks US 6287 283 1.6%
Top 3 banks Japan 6023 271 6.6%
Top 3 banks euro area 5785 260 2.3%
Top 3 banks France 5465 246 10.2%
Top 3 banks Germany 2794 126 3.7%
Top 3 banks Spain 2646 119 9.9%
Top 3 banks Netherlands 2064 93 12.3%
Top 3 banks Italy 1854 83 4.6%
Top 3 banks Belgium 716 32 7.1%
Top 3 banks Austria 377 17 4.5%
Top 3 banks UK 5288 238 8.4%
Top 3 banks Switzerland 1989 90 13.5%
Top 3 banks Sweden 1298 58 11.7%
Top 3 banks Denmark 760 34 11.6%
Source: Bruegel based on ‘Assets from Top 1000 World Banks’ (The Banker, July 2016) and GDP from Worldbank. Note: 
The largest three home-country banks in terms of total assets are chosen for each jurisdiction. Equity is standardised at 4.5 
percent of a bank’s total assets.
For euro-area 
countries, potential 
fiscal costs are 
unevenly distributed 
and range from 4 to 12 
percent of GDP.
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Policy implications and conclusions
This Policy Contribution outlines a fiscal cost scenario for the recapitalisation of large banks 
during a severe systemic crisis. Such support is a last resort, and should only be considered if 
and when the financial stability benefits exceed the recapitalisation costs. Equally important, 
the political willingness to spend large amounts on bank bailouts is much diminished in the 
aftermath of the recent financial crises. This reduced willingness to spend public resources 
on banks is the rationale behind the new bail-in regime, which should indeed be used to the 
maximum extent possible.
Our calculations indicate that large countries, such as the US, China and Japan, would face 
limited potential fiscal costs in the event of a large systemic crisis and can therefore provide a 
credible fiscal backstop to their banking systems. Our calculations also suggest that the credibil-
ity of the fiscal backstop in individual European countries is less strong. For euro-area countries, 
potential fiscal costs are unevenly distributed and range from 4 to 12 percent of GDP. Moreover, 
differences in the strength of the fiscal backstops of euro-area countries contribute to diver-
gences in financing conditions in the banking union (Schoenmaker and Wolff, 2015).
If the fiscal backstop were moved to the euro-area level, it would become as credible as 
that of the US and China. To do so, we propose exploring the idea of using the European Sta-
bility Mechanism (ESM) as the fiscal backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. We also propose 
to improve the so-called ESM Direct Recapitalisation Instrument (DRI), under which the ESM 
can recapitalise systemically important banks directly within the banking union. However, as 
pointed out by Véron (2015) and Merler (2014), the language surrounding direct recapitalisa-
tion changed from ‘breaking the sovereign nexus’ in 2012 to ‘the remaining building blocks 
of the banking union would most likely achieve this aim without the need for DRI to provide 
substantial amounts of fund’ in 20146. Hence, the importance of this tool has been reduced, 
while our analysis puts into question the fiscal capacity of single countries to sustain their 
banking sectors in a systemic crisis.
The conditions for activating the DRI should be reconsidered. Currently, a euro-area 
country can receive an ESM loan to recapitalise its banks, the so-called ‘indirect’ recapitali-
sation of Article 15 in the ESM Treaty. Only when a member’s fiscal sustainability is in danger 
(ESM, 2014) can the ESM directly recapitalise banks from that member country, as long as 
the conditions are met of an own contribution from the member country and a bail-in of 8 
percent of a bank’s total liabilities. Moreover, unanimity of votes is required, which might lead 
to protracted negotiations. None of this will help to find swift and clear answers in a crisis, 
when they will be most needed. The current ESM Direct Recapitalisation Instrument thus falls 
short of an ex-ante credible fiscal backstop at euro-area level, and its governance should be 
reconsidered.
Addressing the fiscal implications of banking union is a necessary step for the greater sta-
bility of the euro area. We have argued that it is also important in order to be able to deal with 
large systemic banking crises. Moving in that direction is difficult because of the potentially 
large-scale fiscal risk sharing that would have to happen, and because of a current perception 
that risks are not equally spread across the banking union. In addition to the different sizes of 
banking systems documented in this paper, banks are differently exposed to sovereign debt7. 
Addressing risk reduction certainly appears necessary from a political point of view to finalise 
banking union.
6  For the changes in language see the Euro-area Summit Statement of 29 June 2012 (available at http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf), compared to European Stability Mechanism, 
‘FAQ on the preliminary agreement on the future ESM direct bank recapitalisation instrument’, June 2014, available at 
http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/FAQPreliminaryDRIJune2014.pdf.
7  Risk reduction can be achieved, for example by introducing some form of large exposure rules on sovereign bond 
holdings or risk weights for sovereign bond holdings (Brunnermeier et al, 2016).
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